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The publication of Bureaucratic Justice' fulfills the promise of Jerry
Mashaw's earlier work2 and makes him a pivotal figure in the long over-
due creation of an "internal" administrative law. While most scholars fo-
cus on the "external" administrative law generated by the interaction of
courts and agencies, Professor Mashaw sets out to prove that the phrase
"bureaucratic justice" is not an oxymoron:
The challenge is to admit the limitations of an externally oriented
administrative law and yet to affirm a vision of administration that is
subject to the normative evaluation and improvement that is the
promise of legal discourse; to view the administrative process, like
the judicial and legislative processes, as somehow in pursuit of justice
and the general welfare; to see "administration," like "democracy"
and "the rule of law," as a motivating ideal.3
This profound and high-minded venture is still needed, despite the long
history of administrative government in the United States, because of our
preoccupation with "external" administrative law. Most influential law-
yers and policymakers evaluate justice in the administrative context with
notions of justice derived from the adversary system. It is as if, when
asked the question what (or where) is administrative justice, they look for
that particular lost coin under the proverbial streetlight of judicial process,
not because the coin is there, but because that is where the light is.'
Mashaw's work ventures out to the dark edges of administrative justice to
illuminate the quality of administrative decisionmaking in the bureau-
cracy itself.5 The author's broad familiarity with the subject and his
t Dean and Joseph M. Jones Professor of Law, Tulane Law School.
1. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772 (1974). This is
a work of fundamental insight, which belongs in the company of such truly original works as Reich,
The Neu, Propery, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
3. P. 14.
4. Mashaw playfully characterizes this tendency as "administrative law's sure instinct for the
capillary." P. 19.
5. While Mashaw does not follow well-traveled roads, neither does he walk alone. Ernst Freund
first offered the idea that administrative law should be concerned with the law produced by adminis-
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multidisciplinary method-he applies not only legal and economic analy-
sis, but also the principles of political and organizational theory-is likely
to interest a wide spectrum of readers.
Professor Mashaw's selection of the Social Security Administration's
disability program as his object of study hardly needs justification. It is
the Mount Everest of bureaucratic structures: One studies it because it is
there. About 1,250,000 initial disability claims are made annually, yield-
ing 150,000 requests for hearings before administrative law judges (ALJs)
and 10,000 filings for judicial review in the federal district courts. 6 Over
5,600 state agency personnel and over 625 ALJs are involved in deciding
these claims. 7 The size of the disability decision system is comparable to
that of the entire federal court system8 and the average discounted present
value of a successful disability claim is three times the statutory amount
required for federal diversity cases.'
Since there are over four million beneficiaries of the disability pro-
gram, 10 and since these awards are often vital to the claimants' well-
being,11 it is clearly in the interests of a just society to do as much as
possible to get the decisions right. Mashaw's task is to move us further in
that direction.
To understand what internal justice in a bureaucratic system such as
the Social Security disability program might look like, the author de-
scribes three models of justice: bureaucratic or instrumental rationality;"
trative practice. E. FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW V (2d ed. 1928). Walter Gellhorn was
the director of the staff of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, which
produced a series of studies submitted to the Committee. See S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. iii
(1941); S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. iii (1940). The Attorney General recommended enact-
ment of legislation embodying the recommendations of the majority of the Committee. See 1941 ATT'Y
GEN. ANN. REP. 2-3. Kenneth Davis has looked closely at the problem of administrative discretion.
See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969) (arguing for new jurisprudence encompassing discre-
tionary justice as well as more formal justice). Extreme public skepticism about the legitimacy of the
administrative process has often placed those who would defend or explain bureaucracy on the defen-
sive. See generally J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978) (recurrent crises in administrative law due to fears that administra-
tive agencies may lack legitimacy).
6. P. 18.
7. Id.
8. In 1982, 206,000 civil cases were filed in the federal courts, see 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. LAW, OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 92, with 860 federal judges (assisted by a
like number of magistrates and staff) available to decide them, id. at 35. As early as fiscal year 1976
more than 625 ALJs disposed of 180,000 cases. See J. MASHAW, C. GoETz, F. GOODMAN, W.
SCHWARTZ & P. VERKUIL, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS xi (1978). There are cur-
rently 770 ALJs assigned to decide disability cases. Telephone interview with Office of Chief ALJ,
Department of Health & Human Services (Nov. 28, 1983).
9. See p. 18 (average present discounted value of successful claim is over $30,000); 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (1976) ($10,000 amount in controversy required to confer federal diversity jurisdiction).
10. Pp. 18-19.
11. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 & n.26 (1976) (family of disabled worker typi-
cally has modest resources).
12. Pp. 25-26.
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professional treatment;1 and moral judgment. 4 The first model empha-
sizes hierarchical review and values both accuracy and efficiency; the sec-
ond emphasizes interpersonal relationships and values client service; and
the third stresses independent decisionmaking and seeks fairness. While
Mashaw finds aspects of all three models in the Social Security disability
system,"' the book focuses on bureaucratic or instrumental rationality as
the best source of an internal administrative law.
In the third chapter, Mashaw admits that even if we accept bureau-
cratic rationality as the appropriate model, the disability program is so
rife with ambiguity, incoherence, and uncertainty that any search for bu-
reaucratic rationality must begin by acknowledging that instrumental ra-
tionality in its pure form is unachievable.18 The statutory definition of
disability itself provides little firm guidance to decisionmakers. A success-
ful claimant must show not only a physical impairment but also an inabil-
ity to perform any job in the national economy.17 The question of job
availability is in most cases a hypothetical one: Could this person, who
has established medical impairments and is out of work, compete in the
national job market? This inquiry does not lend itself to consistent, ra-
tional resolution. Even the medical impairment question, while less specu-
lative, is not easy to get right.
Another challenge to bureaucratic rationality is the dichotomous nature
of the award system: Claimants are either winners or losers, designated as
disabled or not, and entitled to full benefits or none at all.", Since many
cases are too close to call on a consistently rational basis, the system in-
vites arbitrary decisionmaking. As the author understates it, "the line that
Congress drew through the ability-disability continuum when establishing
its eligibility standard cannot be precisely located."1
A further impediment to the emergence of a sound system of rational





17. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2) (1976).
18. P. 53.
19. P. 56. Various actors can nonetheless shift the line. Many state agencies have been more
generous to claimants than the federal officials who set up the guidelines probably intended. See N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (New York and other states have begun to flout federal rules to
help people retain Social Security disability benefits). Congressional amendments to the Social Secur-
ity Act in 1980 made it more difficult to obtain benefits. See Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441 (1980)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421(h) (Supp. V 1981)) (mandating review at 3-year intervals of all awards
not classified as permanent). Congress is now considering legislation that would, over the Administra-
tion's objection, reduce the impact of the 1980 amendments. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at 20,
col. 4 (reporting House committee's approval of bill making it more difficult to cut off Social Security
disability benefits). These oscillations raise further obstacles to uniform administration, especially
when combined with congressional action at the case level, see infra p. 783.
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sight mechanisms it incorporates. There are potentially seven layers to the
formal decision process, involving three species of officials: initial decision
and reconsideration at the state level; the de novo decision of the ALJ and
selective Appeals Council review at the federal administrative level; and
federal judicial appeals to the district court, court of appeals, and Su-
preme Court.20 Congress concerns itself not merely with statutory govern-
ance of the disability program but with recovery in individual cases. As a
result, members of Congress make over 100,000 contacts per year with the
Social Security bureaucracy.21 Members of Congress see this casework
function as part of their mission and encourage the bureaucracy to re-
spond to it in a positive way.
Even the executive branch is not free to ignore individual cases. When
the Reagan Administration's policy of tightening up on non-permanent
disability awards resulted in a state agency's denying benefits to a Viet-
nam veteran who had received the Medal of Honor, critics attacked the
denial as a typical instance of the callousness of a policy that had resulted
in the termination of disability benefits for more than 350,000 people
since March 1981.22 When a spokesman for the Social Security Adminis-
tration announced reversal of that denial by a federal ALJ, all appeared
to breathe a sigh of relief.23 We can only hope that the case does not
establish an irrebuttable presumption in favor of recipients of the Medal
of Honor. Given the conflicting forces at work in the process, however, no
one can be sure.
Mashaw takes these obstacles to the realization of bureaucratic ration-
ality in stride. In an admirable section labeled "exogenous goals," '24 he
concedes that "[t]he basic idea of instrumental rationality-first goals,
then implementing action-may be reversed in the real world of adminis-
tration. ' 25 Rather than letting this realization frustrate his inquiry,
Mashaw sees it as an invitation to shift from deductive to inductive analy-
sis in the search for bureaucratic rationality. His assumption that "learn-
ing by doing will be fed back into the system '2 6 becomes an important
principle of bureaucratic justice. Where the established branches -judi-
cial, legislative, and executive-speak with institutionally competitive
voices, some neutral institution must assimilate and rationalize the various
messages. Thus, to the conventional system of checks and balances, the
author adds a fourth participant: "The only change in the conventional
20. P. 18.
21. P. 58.
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model-and it is one that this essay insists upon-is that Bureaucracy has
been admitted to the pantheon of institutional heroes."27 The boldness of
this suggestion should not be overlooked. It implicitly rejects the classic
condemnation of administrative agencies as the "headless fourth branch"28
of government and suggests that there is an affirmative role for bureau-
cracy as an institutional umpire of conflicting social directions.
To secure bureaucracy's place in the august company of the established
branches is no small task. Mashaw concedes that the bureaucracy is sub-
ject to a fair amount of institutional incompetence, subversion, and arbi-
trariness.29 He argues, however, that "the critic of institutions should...
be concerned with the reasonableness of structures for decisionmaking that
modify the pursuit of the ideal.""0 This "second best" notion is used to
introduce the body of organizational thinking that talks in terms of "satis-
fice" rather than "optimize" and emphasizes the limitations upon any in-
stitution's ability to conform to models of ideal decisionmaking. For exam-
pie, political realities make two of the irrational forces upon disability
determinations difficult to overcome. State-level decisionmaking, with de-
ciders who are not under the direct control of the organization that pays
the bill, introduces discord into the system, as do congressional inquiries
into particular cases. Yet the force of politics-federalism and raw budget-
ary power-prevents the Social Security Administration from objecting se-
riously. Mashaw accepts this bureaucratic posture as a practical (though
subversive) limitation upon the organization's ability to reform itself:
"The critical question is to what degree the pursuit of organizational
goals undermines the pursuit of program goals."3' 1
Mashaw emphasizes that the actual deciders in the disability system
must ultimately assimilate and rationalize the conflicting signals of the
other branches. The tension is between what he calls "systematic" ration-
ality and "intuitive" rationality. 2 The former seeks to make the bureau-
cracy more "controllable" by the use of clear rules and objective perform-
27. P. 58.
28. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 40 (1937). This characterization of administrative agencies has
enjoyed a long and popular life. See Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council,
103 S. Ct. 3556, 3558 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he independent agencies, once created, for
all practical purposes are a fourth branch of the government not subject to the direct control of either
Congress or the executive branch."). The usual corrective is to place the so-called independent agen-
cies under the control of one of the "real" branches. See ABA COMM'N ON L. & ECON., FEDERAL
REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 15 (1979) (advocating executive control of independent regulatory
agency policymaking). In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent invalidation of a legislative veto,
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ance standards; the latter relies instead upon the moral judgments implicit
in "creative" individual determinations. Mashaw's hunch is that intuitive
rationality, which incorporates aspects of all three justice models, may be
the best we can do. Yet he is unwilling to discard the idea of systematic
rationality: "Some mixture of justice models and decisional techniques
may be necessary to deal with the predictable failures of the systems engi-
neers to rationalize fully bureaucratic implementation."3 The chapter
closes on this intentionally ambiguous note.
Having placed bureaucratic rationality on the couch, Mashaw begins
the analysis in chapter four by asking the efficiency question: How much
are we as a society willing to pay for better disability decisions? Mashaw
properly declares that the private market measure-how much an individ-
ual claimant is willing to pay to have a case decided-is an inadequate
criterion for determining the appropriate level of societal investment in
disability decisionmaking. The entitlement nature of the disability pro-
gram presumes that society is not neutral about outcomes-it is
pro-claimant in the sense that the government steps in to provide recovery
for qualified individuals. Thus, as Mashaw notes, "[t]he basic rationale
for the program is distributive justice, not allocational efficiency."3" This
insight is important in analyzing all government programs, but it is fun-
damental to the disability program, where the beneficiaries are frequently
in the lower-income brackets.
3 5
Shifting the analysis from private costs and benefits to social ones does
not, however, answer the question of how far society should go to decide
the cases correctly. The current average investment in disability decisions
is far less than their value-$500 in decision costs for claims which aver-
age $30,000.8 Mashaw concludes from this ratio that a considerable in-
crease in public decision expenditures could be justified if the net social
benefit were to increase. Reaching a conclusion on that point is important
to his argument.
The first step is to recognize the differential effect of decisional errors
in the disability program. Denials of benefits to people clearly disabled, or
grants of benefits to those clearly not disabled, are more socially costly
than grants or denials at the margin of disability. This proposition leads
Mashaw to explore (and favor) rules for decision that "tend to eliminate
[erroneous grants or denials] near the poles of the eligibility continuum.13 7
Mashaw argues that the objectification of eligibility standards through
33. P. 77. The decisional techniques he contrasts are the highly rule-bound state agency decisions
based on written submissions, and the ALJ oral hearings, which are personalized or intuitive.
34. P. 81.
35. See supra note 11.
36. Pp. 81-82.
37. P. 85.
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rulemaking is the best way to avoid the high cost errors at the extremes.3 8
The idea is that the costliest errors are the product of the mistakes most
susceptible to generic correction.
While the polar (or clear) cases are basic to any evaluation of the disa-
bility system's efficacy, they are likely to be far smaller in number than
the marginal cases. Thus, while the mistakes in the clear cases have a
much higher individual social value, mistakes in the marginal cases may
have a higher aggregate social value. Because of their number, these cases
are more likely to attract public and political attention. Any decision sys-
tem must have a satisfactory way of resolving them before it can be vindi-
cated, yet generic standards incorporated in rules are rarely adequate to
the task. Nor can we decide difficult cases by the administrative
equivalent of coin flips. 9 As public "entitlements," there is an expectation
that disability benefits will be administered on an individual basis, even
where it is difficult if not impossible to make reliable distinctions among
close cases.
The public perception of fairness is central to any critique of public
decisionmaking. Mashaw accepts the perception of inequality in decision-
making as a high social cost for a democracy. He is on very soft theoreti-
cal ground here, and most economists would quickly dismiss the notion
that one can put any meaningful value upon the social costs or benefits of
perceptions of unequal treatment in public decisionmaking. At this point
in the analysis, therefore, it is necessary for Mashaw to argue that a con-
cern for "process values" should supplement economists' traditional con-
cern for the accuracy of decisionmaking.40
Mashaw's emphasis on the process value of equality leads him to ques-
tion the propriety of adversarial disability determinations and to suggest
other process values that should be taken into account in designing an
appropriate adjudicatory scheme.4 ' He seeks to transfer the positive at-
tributes of the adversary process (which he claims supports "the basic lib-
eral values of individuality, autonomy, and self-respect") to his system of
bureaucratic rationality.42 This effort to create an individualized bureau-
38. Pp. 106-08; see Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983) (upholding SSA "grid" regula-
tion for determining existence of jobs in national economy for persons of certain medical characteris-
tics and abilities).
39. Mashaw states that we would be offended by coin tossing as a decisional process. P. 93. He
rejects quota systems as inappropriate for the disability program, while recognizing the utility of such
techniques in allocating FCC broadcast licenses or awarding government contracts. Pp. 87-88.
40. Pp. 88-89.
41. The other values Mashaw describes are transparency (by which he means openness), privacy,
humaneness, appropriate symbolism, and participation. Pp. 88-97.
42. Pp. 88-89. Mashaw believes that the negative aspects of the adversary process, especially the
inability to invoke it effectively without private resources, remove any clear reasons for preferring its
use in the disability system. P. 96.
786
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cratic process makes his contribution to the procedural side of the public
property debate potentially as significant as Charles Reich's contribution
to the substantive theory of public entitlements.,3 I applaud Mashaw's
efforts."" Nonetheless, to imbue a public decision model with the process
values of the adversary system 5 without duplicating that system's negative
aspects, such as high cost and delay, is a formidable task.
In support of his claim that an alternative public decision model is re-
quired, Mashaw argues that disability decisions in a world of universal
adversary hearings would founder on "interminable hearing delays or fis-
cal disaster."4 Given the inability of SSA deciders to compromise or settle
cases,"7 there is little prospect of a successful mass transference of the ad-
versarial model to the disability program. A modified approach is
needed.4
8
Mashaw stakes his case for a new model on the capacity of the bureau-
cracy "to make its internal structure and operation respond to a sensible
set of demands for rational, fair, and efficient adjudication."' 9 He identi-
fies the two major deficiencies of the current disability process as informa-
tional and conceptual. Without information on the accuracy and fairness
of decisions, the "unique claim of a bureaucratically rational system to
our support"' 5  is undermined. Similarly, "conceptual timidity" prevents
the bureaucracy from embracing either the hearing process or some other
process. This ambivalence subjects the decision system that emerges to the
charge of second-class justice.5"
Mashaw considers three reforms of the current system. One retains the
43. Reich, supra note 2. Reich sought the "full adjudicatory procedures" of the adversary system
to vindicate his public property rights. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1253 (1965). One scholar has openly questioned the appropriate-
ness of employing a private-rights decision model (the adversary system) to vindicate a public-rights
property concept. See Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 479, 499-500 (1966) (power of welfare officials to thwart legislative programs "by simply
doing nothing" is beyond "traditional judicial-type techniques of control"). Mashaw's implicit critique
of Reich's assumptions is more sweeping.
44. See generally Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 258 (1978) (discussing history, normative requirements, and types of administrative procedures,
and providing critical analysis of Administrative Procedure Act and other procedural statutes);
Verkuil, The Search for a Legal Ethic: The Adversayy System, Liberalism and Beyond, 60 SOUND-
INGS 54 (1977) (advocating recognition of connection among liberalism, pluralism, and the adversary
system before exploring alternatives to these theories).
45. The case for the adversary model in private dispute resolution has been convincingly demon-
strated. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975).
46. P. 192.
47. The SSA is not empowered to settle close cases, nor may it make partial awards, see p. 53,
which can have the same effect as settlements. As Mashaw notes, settlement is the norm in most
adversary systems. P. 192.
48. P. 193.
49. P. 194 (emphasis in original).
50. P. 195.
51. P. 197.
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current reconsideration process but supplements it with more face-to-face
contact between the claimant and the deciders (especially at the state re-
consideration stage) and more involvement of claimant representatives.
Both mechanisms are designed to improve the flow of information to the
decisionmakers, and thereby to increase accuracy and encourage the per-
ception that the system is fair.
Both would also increase costs. Face-to-face encounters seem likely to
increase the number of grants because the decider has both a better sense
of the claimant's actual situation and a greater reluctance to reject those
who appear in person.52 It is difficult to know beforehand which effect is
stronger. If Mashaw's concern with the poorly developed file is justified
(as it seems to be), there is as much likelihood that face-to-face contact
will increase accurate decisionmaking as that it will increase merely sym-
pathetic decisionmaking. 53 Mashaw feels that representatives will also re-
duce the information gap (both from the claimant's and the system's per-
spectives), and that they will filter out frivolous claims54 and increase the
claimant's sense of fair treatment.
Oral appearances and representation55 are classic ingredients of the ad-
versary model. 56 Their adoption would thus move the disability system in
the direction of the adversary model, about which Mashaw has already
expressed doubts. Perhaps for this reason he cautions that his proposal,
52. SSA experiments with interviews at the reconsideration stage indicate a tendency towards a
higher level of awards. See pp. 199-200. The effects of face-to-face encounters may also help to
explain the frequency of ALJ reversals of denied claims, see pp. 41-42, since ALJs are the first
deciders actually to see the claimant in the present system.
53. The value Mashaw places on the decider's "sympathetic association with the claimant's situa-
tion," p. 202, is problematic. Sympathy in public decisionmakers is difficult to evaluate or control; it
can be easily transformed into bias or even discrimination. See V. THOMPSON, WITHOUT SYMPATHY
OR ENTHUSIASM: THE PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPASSION 1-19 (1975).
54. P. 200. Mashaw expects a lot from government representatives when he suggests that they
may serve to reduce frivolous appeals by counseling clear losers to accept defeat. Counseling would
likely be better performed by representatives who must rely upon a claimant's recovery for their fee
than by government-financed representatives.
55. Mashaw uses "representation" to include both legal and non-legal representatives whom the
government would provide. Pp. 200-01. In suggesting that representatives need not be lawyers, he
points with approval to the Veterans' Administration system of claims representatives. P. 201. That
comparison, however, only opens a whole new area for study, i.e., how well does the VA claims
system work? With over $13 billion in disability payments awarded to over 3,000,000 beneficiaries in
fiscal year 1982, see 1982 ADM'R OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS ANNUAL REPORT 67, the VA system is of
comparable magnitude to the SSA disability program. Much less is known about the VA's methods of
awarding benefits, however, since it deals with a more homogeneous client base under its own con-
gressional mandates and does not have its determinations reviewed by the courts. Under those circum-
stances, one should be cautious about endorsing the VA's representation scheme without further study
of the entire system. Representational organizations like the American Legion or the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, for example, are certainly not uncontroversial.
56. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970). Mashaw's proposal to provide represent-
atives at government expense, see supra note 55, goes beyond the adversary-system ingredients which
Goldberg declared are required by the due process clause.
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along with the two other non-adversary alternatives he discusses,5" should
be tested before being fully implemented. He offers no method for select-
ing among these proposals but urges the Social Security Administration to
experiment with them to determine which decision format best advances
the decision values Mashaw has articulated.58 Under these conditions of
uncertainty, it would take an heroic agency head to go forward.
Running through Mashaw's analysis is a yet more radical suggestion
that would work a dramatic change in SSA disability procedures. He sug-
gests that oral appearances and representation might be employed at the
reconsideration stage of the state intake process and be used in lieu of
ALJ hearings, and perhaps even of judicial review. 59 This would make
the SSA disability system look much like its counterpart at the Veterans'
Administration, a prospect that poses additional questions.60 The opposi-
tion to such a proposal from the ALJ corps and the claimant population
who rely upon judicial review would probably exceed those political forces
that currently keep the states' decision role alive. Given the author's sensi-
tivity to political realities, 1 this proposal seems uncharacteristically
utopian.
But perhaps I have read Mashaw too hard on that score. If more face-
to-face contact and claimant representation at the state reconsideration
stage can improve the quality of decisions, they may be worth exploring as
an add-on to the present decision system, even though they are costly.
Given the current relatively low average cost of decisions, any suggestion
that raises the accuracy of decisions-even if it is more expensive to the
decision system-may result in a net social benefit to the program and the
public.62 The critical element seems to be earlier and better development
of cases to maximize the flow of information to and from the claimant,
and thereby improve the correctness of decisions. Mashaw hopes that this
effect alone will reduce appeal rates and increase claimant satisfaction.68
57. They are the use of medical examination panels and the use of multidisciplinary "work-
shops." Pp. 202-09.
58. P. 209.
59. Pp. 198, 209.
60. See supra note 55.
61. See supra p. 784.
62. Of course, there can be no automatic assumption that an increase in decision costs will bring
about a comparable increase in accurate decisionmaking. There is no necessary relationship between
the improvement in marginal outcomes and the increased decision expenditures. The point is only that
one can afford to experiment, where decision costs are low, so as to measure whether these expendi-
tures will increase accuracy of outcomes by more than their costs.
63. One concern with earlier adversary development of case files is its impact on the ALJ
stage-assuming this stage is not eliminated. SSA ALJs are known for their "sympathetic" case devel-
opment on behalf of unrepresented claimants. Making them more neutral and detached will not be
easy, or even necessarily beneficial. Another possibility is to permit ALJs to make partial awards in
close cases. This would require statutory authorization, whereas Mashaw's suggestions could be im-
plemented administratively. Given the author's willingness to consider structural changes in the ALJs'
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The success of Mashaw's undertaking is not to be judged solely on the
basis of the likely effectiveness of his proposed modifications to the ex-
isting SSA disability system. His role is entirely justified as an expository
and explanatory one: Few lawyers have analyzed a complex decision on
its own terms so well.
Mashaw's concluding words, born as they are of careful empirical anal-
ysis, have an inspirational quality: "My conclusion is that bureaucratic
rationality-at least as practiced by SSA in the disability program-is a
promising form of administrative justice. It permits the effective pursuit of
collective ends without inordinately sacrificing individualistic or demo-
cratic ideals."'6 4 These words express the hope that the goals of distribu-
tive justice can be met within the confines of the twentieth-century liberal
state. But, as Mashaw observes, improvements to the disability decision
system (and other bureaucracies like it) continue to founder on wrong-
headed notions of external reform. 5 Why is it that in order to legitimate
bureaucratic decisionmaking we continue to resort to the single-minded
use of judicial emulation and oversight? Or, as Mashaw puts it: "Must
we strive forever within a conceptual framework that either denies its own
underlying reality or compares it deprecatingly with institutional and le-
gal structures that our substantive public policy long ago abandoned?""
The importance of this observation can hardly be overstated. We have
never satisfactorily harmonized substance and procedure as we have be-
come increasingly concerned with matters of distributive justice.' 7 As a
consequence, we still hamstring income-transfer programs with proce-
dures that either frustrate, or fail to assist, achievement of the program's
goals. This is Mashaw's message, but it has been lost even to some of
those who endorse the substantive outcomes themselves, including the
seminal thinker on this subject, Charles Reich." Until we are prepared to
come to grips with the domination of adversarial thinking on public deci-
sionmaking, all attempts to legitimate alternative models are doomed to
failure.6 9
Legitimating an alternative model requires not only expanding the bu-





67. See supra note 43. Chase argues that well into the first half of the 20th century legal scholars
impeded the development of judicial control over the administrative system. W. CHASE, THE AMERI-
CAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT (1982).
68. See supra note 43.
69. See Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adersary System, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
845, 846 (1975) (domination of adversary system has impeded development of ombudsman
alternative).
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reaucratic rationality model that Mashaw endorses, but retaining non-
adversarial characteristics in established programs currently outside of
traditional judicial control. The VA disability program, for example, is
constantly challenged by those who want to make its decisions subject to
judicial review.71 Mashaw regards the VA solution-no ALJs and no ju-
dicial review-as more to be emulated than condemned.71 Unless the bu-
reaucratic rationality model becomes a legitimate alternative mode of deci-
sionmaking, however, the odds are much greater that the VA system will
be forced to conform to the judicial control model than that other systems
will break free of that model. For this reason, scholars like Mashaw, who
have the necessary expertise and objectivity to undertake further study of
the VA system, should do so before it succumbs to entreaties for judicial
control. At a time when we are searching for a cure to the litigation ex-
plosion, empirical research with a healthy skepticism for traditional solu-
tions should be broadly encouraged.
Mashaw has shown that bureaucratic rationality is a justice model that
has a greater chance of ensuring correct decisions in disability cases than
does a system of individual legal or constitutional rights administered by
the courts. The effort has profound implications for the future of demo-
cratic government. In decrying "[tihe troublesome lack of a positive sym-
bol of bureaucracy,"7' 2 he has helped to create one. But the most enduring
contribution of Bureaucratic Justice is not symbolic; it is practical, analyt-
ical policymaking for a complex decision system of great significance to
many Americans.
70. Decisions of the Veterans' Administration Administrator on questions of fact or law are not
currently subject to review. See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976). But see Rabin, Preclusion of Judidal
Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv.
905 (1975) (exploring arguments supporting judicial review of Veterans' Administration Administra-
tor's decisions and favoring judicial review); F. Davis, Judicial Review of Benefits Decisions of the
Veterans' Administration (1978) (unpublished report of Administrative Conference of the United
States).
71. See supra p. 789.
72. P. 225.

